Applied Cryptography and Network Security: 14th - download pdf or read online

By Mark Manulis, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Steve Schneider

ISBN-10: 3319395548

ISBN-13: 9783319395548

ISBN-10: 3319395556

ISBN-13: 9783319395555

This ebook constitutes the refereed court cases of the 14th overseas convention on utilized Cryptography and community defense, ACNS 2016, held in Guildford, united kingdom. in June 2016. five. The 35 revised complete papers incorporated during this quantity and provided including 2 invited talks, have been conscientiously reviewed and chosen from 183 submissions.ACNS is an annual convention concentrating on cutting edge study and present advancements that strengthen the components of utilized cryptography, cyber defense and privateness.

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Read or Download Applied Cryptography and Network Security: 14th International Conference, ACNS 2016, Guildford, UK, June 19-22, 2016. Proceedings PDF

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Example text

Servers can be impersonated even if we rule out online relays (an adversary just forwards messages from a server to a client instance, and vice versa): A merely performs an out-of-order (offline) relay as described in the third scenario of Fig. 2, as explained below. This is the gap between the client- and the server-impersonation guarantees for the AKA protocol. Our server-impersonation model rules out both offline and online relays, whereas client-impersonation only rules out online relays. A S C Send(m) ←−−−−−−−− m −−−−−−−−→ A S Send(m) ←−−−−−−−− m −−−−−−−−→ Send(m ) −−−−−−−−→ m ←−−−−−−−− Send(m ) ←−−−−−−−− online relay (pure relays) C Send(m∗ ) −−−−−−−−→ m ←−−−−−−−− m ←−−−−−−−− no relay (different messages) A S Send(m) ←−−−−−−−− m −−−−−−−−→ C Send(m) ˆ −−−−−−−−→ m ←−−−−−−−− Send(m ) −−−−−−−−→ offline relay (out of order) Fig.

A S C Send(m) ←−−−−−−−− m −−−−−−−−→ A S Send(m) ←−−−−−−−− m −−−−−−−−→ Send(m ) −−−−−−−−→ m ←−−−−−−−− Send(m ) ←−−−−−−−− online relay (pure relays) C Send(m∗ ) −−−−−−−−→ m ←−−−−−−−− m ←−−−−−−−− no relay (different messages) A S Send(m) ←−−−−−−−− m −−−−−−−−→ C Send(m) ˆ −−−−−−−−→ m ←−−−−−−−− Send(m ) −−−−−−−−→ offline relay (out of order) Fig. 2. Examples of Online and Offline relays. For the AKA protocol, the message m is the client’s UID, which the adversary can learn. The message m is a valid authentiˆ cation challenge, and the message m is the authentication response.

Keyindistinguishability and impersonation security, and to local untrusted serving networks, denoted “servers”, namely state-confidentiality and soundness. We prove that the unmodified AKA protocol attains these properties as long as servers cannot be corrupted. Furthermore, adding a unique server identifier suffices to guarantee all the security statements even in in the presence of corrupted servers. We use a modular proof approach: the first step is to prove the security of (modified and unmodified) AKA with generic cryptographic algorithms that can be represented as a unitary pseudorandom function –PRF– keyed either with the client’s secret key or with the operator key.

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Applied Cryptography and Network Security: 14th International Conference, ACNS 2016, Guildford, UK, June 19-22, 2016. Proceedings by Mark Manulis, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Steve Schneider


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